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-EDITOR.

One completely false assumption accounts for of any interrogation tactic or technique that is
most of the legal restrictions on police interroga- apt to make an innocent person confess. I am
tions. It is this, and the fallacy is certainly per- opposed, therefore, to the use of force, threats,
petuated to a very considerable extent by mystery or promises of leniency-all of which might well
writers, the movies, and TV: whenever a crime is induce an innocent person to confess; but I do
committed, if the police will only look carefully at approve of such psychological tactics and techthe crime scene they will almost always find some niques as trickery and deceit that are not only
due that will lead them to the offender and helpful but frequently necessary in order to seat the same time establish his guilt; and once cure incriminating information from the guilty,
the offender is located, he will readily confess or investigative leads from otherwise uncooperaor disclose his guilt by trying to shoot his way tive witnesses or informants.
out of the trap. But this is pure fiction; in actuality
My position, then, is this, and it may be prethe situation is quite different. As a matter of sented in the form of three separate points,' each
fact, the art of criminal investigation has not accompanied by case illustrations:
developed to a point where the search for and the
1. Many criminal cases, even when investigated
examination of physical evidence will always, or by the best qualified police departments, are capable
even in most cases, reveal a clue to the identity of of solution only by means of an admission or conthe perpetrator or provide the necessary proof of fession from the guilty individual or upon the, basis
his guilt. In criminal investigations, even of the of information obtained from the questioning of
most efficient type, there are many, many instances other criminalsuspects.
where physical clues are entirely absent, and
As to the validity of this statement, I suggest
the only approach to a possible solution of the that consideration be given to the situation precrime is the interrogation of the criminal suspect
sented by cases such as these. A man is hit on
himself, as well as others who may possess sig- the head while walking home late at night. He
nificant information. Moreover, in most instances did not see his assailant, nor did anyone else.
these interrogations, particularly of the suspect A careful and thorough search of the crime scene
himself, must be conducted under conditions of reveals no physical clues. Then take the case
privacy and for a reasonable period of time; of a women who is grabbed on the street at night
and they frequently require the use of psychologi- and dragged into an alley and raped. Here, too,
cal tactics and techniques that could well be the assailant was unaccommodating enough to
classified as "unethical," if we are to evaluate avoid leaving his hat or other means of identificathem in terms of ordinary, everyday social beI The writer has presented and discussed these
havior.
three points in various other published papers, both
To protect myself from being misunderstood,
before and since they were presented at the InternaI want to make it unmistakably clear that I
tional Conference on Criminal Law Administration in
1960. See: 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948); 52
am not an advocate of the so-called "third de- February,
Nw. U.L. REv. 77 (1957); 3 CRm. L.Q. (Canada) 329
gree," for I am unalterably opposed to the use (1960); 3 N.U. TRI-Q. 3 (1961).
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tion at the crime scene; and there are no othei
physical clues. All the police have to work on is the
description of the assailant given by the victim
herself. She described him as about six feet tall,
white, and wearing a dark suit. Or consider this
case, an actual recent one in Illinois. Three women
are vacationing in a wooded resort area. Their
bodies are found dead alongside a foot trail, the
result of physical violence, and no physical clues
are present.
In cases of this kind-and they all typify the
difficult investigation problem that the police frequently encounter-how else can they be solved,
if at all, except by means of the interrogation
of suspects or of others who may possess significant information?
There are times, too, when a police interrogation may result not only in the apprehension
and conviction of the guilty, but also in the release
of the innocent from well-warranted suspicion.
Here is one such actual case within my own
professional experience.
The dead body of a woman was found in her
home. Her skull had been crushed, apparently
with some blunt instrument. A careful police
investigation of the premises did not reveal any
clues to the identity of the killer. No fingerprints
or other significant evidence were located; not
even the lethal instrument itself could be found.
None of the neighbors could give any helpful
information. Although there was some evidence of a
slight struggle in the room where the body lay,
there were no indications of a forcible entry into
the home. The deceased's young daughter was the
only other resident of the home and she had been
away in school at the time of the. crime. The
daughter could not give the police any idea of
what, if any, money or property had disappeared
from the home.
For several reasons the police considered the
victim's husband a likely suspect. He was being
sued for divorce; he knew his wife had planned on
leaving the state and taking their daughter with
her; and the neighbors reported that the couple
had been having heated arguments, and that
the husband was of a violent temper. He also
lived conveniently near-in a garage adjoining
the home. The police interrogated him and although his alibi was not conclusive his general
behavior and the manner.in which he answered the
interrogator's questions satisfied the police of his
innocence. Further investigation then revealed

that the deceased's brother-in-law had been
financially indebted to the deceased; that he was
a frequent gambler; that at a number of social
gatherings which he had attended money disappeared from some of the women's purses;
that at his place of employment there had been
a series of purse thefts; and that on the day of
the killing he was absent from work. The police
apprehended and questioned him. As the result
of a few hours of competent interrogation-unattended by any abusive methods, but yet conducted during a period of delay in presenting
the suspect before a committing magistrate as
required by state statute-the suspect confessed
to the murder. He told of going to the victim's
home for the purpose of selling her a radio, which
she accused him of stealing. An argument ensued
and he hit her over the head with a mechanic's
wrench he was carrying in his coat pocket. He
thereupon located and took some money he
found in the home and also a diamond ring. After
fleeing from the scene he threw the wrench into a
river, changed his clothes and disposed of the ones
he had worn at the time of the killing by throwing
them away in various parts of the city. He had
hidden the ring in the attic of his mother's home,
where it was found by the police after his confession
had disclosed its presence there. Much of the
stolen money was also recovered or else accounted
for by the payment of an overdue loan.
Without an opportunity for interrogation the
police could not have solved this case. The perpetrator of the offense would have remained
at liberty, perhaps to repeat his criminal conduct.
2. Criminal offenders, except, of course, those
caught in the commission of their crimes, ordinarily
will not admit their guilt unless questioned under
conditions of privacy, and for a period of perhaps
several hours.
This point is one which should be readily apparent not only to any person with the least amount
of criminal investigative experience, but also to
anyone who will reflect momentarily upon the
behavior of ordinary law-abiding persons when
suspected or accused of nothing more than simple
social indiscretions. Self-condemnation and selfdestruction not being normal behavior characteristics, human beings ordinarily do not utter
unsolicited, spontaneous confessions. They must
first be questioned regarding the offense. In some
instances, a little bit of information inadvertently
given to a competent interrogator by the suspect
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may suffice to start a line of investigation which
might ultimately establish guilt. Upon other
occasions, a full confession, with a revelation of
details regarding a body, the loot, or the instruments used in the crime, may be required to
prove the case. But whatever the possible consequences may be, it is impractical to expect
any but a very few confessions to result from a
guilty conscience unprovoked by an interrogation.
It is also impractical to expect admissions or
confessions to be obtained under circumstances
other than privacy. Here again recourse to our
everyday experience will support the basic validity
of this requirement. For instance, in asking a
personal friend to divulge a secret, or embarrassing
information, we carefully avoid making the request in the presence of other persons, and seek a
time and place when the matter can be discussed
in private. The very same psychological factors
are involved in a criminal interrogation, and even to
a greater extent. For related psychological considerations, if an interrogation is to be had at all,
it must be one based upon an unhurried interview,
the necessary length of which will in many instances extend to several hours, depending upon
various factors such as the nature of the case
situation and the personality of the suspect.
The practical psychological requirement of
privacy during a police interrogation calls, of
course, for a consideration of the issue of an
accused person's constitutional right to counsel.
Does the right to counsel come into being at the
time of arrest, or only at the time of trial, or
perhaps at the time the judicial process begins
(e.g., preliminary hearing, indictment, etc.)? And
if the right to counsel starts at the time 6f arrest,
or at some other stage prior to the trial itself,
what about the legal validity of a confession
obtained at a time when the accused was denied
access to counsel? The answers to these questions
are of considerable importance to all concerned.
If the right to counsel arises only at the time of
trial, or even when the judicial process begins, as
at a preliminary hearing or at the time of indictment, the police have at least some opportunity
for an interrogation. On the other hand, if the
right is considered to exist immediately upon arrest,
the interrogation opportunity, for all practical
purposes, is gone-because of the prevailing concept that the role of defense counsel is to advise
his client, "keep your mouth shut; don't say anything to anybody."
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That an accused person is entitled to counsel
at the time of trial is a proposition that should
and must stand unchallenged. It may also be
conceded that the right to counsel should be
considered to exist just as soon as the judicial
process begins (e.g., preliminary hearing, indictment, etc.), although the case law over the years
is to the effect that the right to counsel arises
only in a proceeding that adjudicates guilt or
innocence; in other words, it arises at the trial
itself, and not at any pre-trial hearing. 2 However,
there are several reasons for not extending the
right beyond the judicial process stage. First of all,
the constitutional right to counsel provision itself
refers only to the right in "criminal prosecutions."
Moreover, anyone exploring this right to counsel
issue must also consider the United States Supreme
Court decision in Betts v. Brady,3 to the effect
that, with respect to indigent defendants, a state
is under no due process requirement to appoint
counsel in non-capital cases. As the majority
opinion points out, the due-process line has to be
drawn somewhere; otherwise counsel would have
to be provided for an indigent person in a civil
case involving a risk of property deprivation,
since the due process guarantee prevails with
respect to property as well as to life and liberty.
In my judgment the right to counsel at the
time of trial, or even at the very start of the
judicial process, should be accorded and provided
to all indigent defendants, insofar as practicable,
regardless of whether the case involves a capital
or non-capital offense, or even if it amounts only
to a misdemeanor. What I do object to is an extension of the right to arrestees, indigent or nonindigent, prior to the start of the judicial process.
It is not constitutionally required, and practical
considerations will not tolerate such an extension,
and particularly so if the extension is supplemented
by a rule of court that would nullify, as a violation of due process, a confession obtained during a
period of police detention before the start of the
judicial process. Moreover, sometime in the near
future we will have to come to grips with this
interrogation problem and consider the passage of
legislation, by all the states as well as the federal
2 See Comment, 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 286 (1958), and
cases cited therein.

In Spano-v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), the
concurring opinion drew the "right to counsel" line
at the point where the judicial process begins; in this
particular case, upon the indictment of the accused.
3316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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government, which will specifically provide for
a reasonable period of police detention for the
interrogation of suspects who are not otherwise
unwilling to talk.
The United States Supreme Court-or at least
the majority thereof-has sensed the implications,
insofar as the states are concerned, of a rule of
law that would hold the right to counsel to exist
at the time of arrest. The Court was confronted
with this issue in the 1958 cases of Crooker v.
California4 and Cicenia v. La Gay,' in both of
which state police officers had obtained confessions
from arrestees who had previously requested but
were denied the benefit of legal counsel. In 5-4
decisions the Court held that there was no due
process violation and that the confessions were
therefore admissible in evidence.
It is of interest to note the consideration which
the majority of the Court gave to the position
urged upon it by defense counsel in these two
cases: "It can hardly be denied," states the
majority opinion, "that adoption of petitioner's
position would constrict state police activities in
a manner that in many instances might impair
their ability to solve difficult cases." Also, according to the majority, "the doctrine suggested by
petitioner would have a... devastating effect on
enforcement of criminal law, for it would effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well as
-unfair-untilthe accused was afforded opportunity
to call his attorney." The Court may well have
added, "who would tell him to keep his mouth
shut."
Regarding the routine advice of counsel to an
arrestee to remain silent and refuse to answer
questions put to him by the police, it is my suggestion that the legal profession give serious
consideration to the adoption of an alternative
practice, which would require counsel to say to
his client, the arrestee: "Although you do not have
to say anything, my advice to you is that you
discuss this matter with the police and that you
tell them the truth; I'll stand by to protect you
from any harm or abuse." With the advent of such
a change in the ethical concept of the role of
counsel, we might then be able to say that all
arrestees should be entitled to counsel from the
time of their arrest. As matters now stand, however, public protection and safety require that we
adhere to the present viewpoint that there is no
4357

U.S. 433 (1958).
6357 U.S. 504 (1958).

right to counsel during the investigative, nonjudicial stage of the case.
3. In dealing with criminal offenders, and consequently also with criminalsuspects who may actually
be innocent, the interrogator must of necessity
employ less refined methods than are considered
appropriatefor the transaction of ordinary, everyday affairs by and between law-abiding citizens.
To illustrate this point, permit me to revert to
the previously discussed case of the woman who
was murdered by her brother-in-law. His confession was obtained largely as a result of the interrogator adopting a friendly attitude in questioning
the suspect, when concededly no such genuine feeling existed; by pretending to sympathize with
the suspect because of his difficult financial situation; by suggesting that perhaps the victim had
done or said something which aroused his anger and
which would have aroused the anger of anyone
else similarly situated to such an extent as to provoke a violent reaction; and by resorting to other
similar expressions, or even overtures of friendliness
and sympathy such as a pat on the suspects
shoulder or knee. In all of this, of course, the
interrogation was "unethical" according to the
standards usually set for professional, business
and social conduct. But the pertinent issue in this
case was no ordinary, lawful, professional, business
or social matter. It involved the taking of a
human life by one who abided by no code of fair
play toward his fellow human beings. The killer
would not have been moved one bit toward a confession by subjecting him to a reading or lecture
regarding the morality of his conduct. It would
have been futile merely to give him a pencil and
paper and trust that his conscience would impel
him to confess. Something more was requiredsomething which was in its essence an "unethical"
practice on the part of the interrogator. But,
under the circumstances involved in this case, how
else would the murderer's guilt have been established? Moreover, let us bear this thought in
mind. From the criminal's point of view, any
interrogation of him is objectionable. To him
it may be a "dirty trick" to be talked into a
confession, for surely it was not done for his
benefit. Consequently, any interrogation of him
might be labeled as deceitful or unethical.
Of necessity, criminal interrogators must deal
with criminal offerfders on a somewhat lower
moral plane than that upon which ethical, lawabiding citizens are expected to conduct their
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everyday
innocent
following
"unfair"

affairs. That plane, in the interest of
suspects, need only be subject to the
restriction: Although both "fair" and
interrogation practices are permissible,
nothing shall be done or said to the subject that
will be apt to make an innocent person confess.
If all this be so, why then the withholding of
this essential interrogation opportunity from the
police. And we do, insofar as the stated law is concerned. It comes in the form of statutes or rules
that require the prompt delivery of an arrested
person before a magistrate for a preliminary hearing or arraignment. Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court has decreed that in federal cases
no confession is to be received in evidence, regardless of its voluntariness or trustworthiness, if it
was obtained during a period of unnecessary
delay in delivering the arrestee to a federal commissioner or judge for arraignment. In the federal
jurisdiction of Washington, D. C., which must cope
with a variety of criminal offences and problems
similar to any other city of comparable size, this
federal court rule has had a very crippling effect
6
on police investigations.
One incongruity of the prompt arraignment rule
is this. It is lawful for the police to arrest upon
reasonable belief that the arrestee has committed
the offense, following which they must take him
before a magistrate, without unnecessary delay,
and charge him with the crime; but for legal
proof of the charge, his guilt at the time of trial
must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Moreover, when the accused gets into the hands
of a magistrate for the preliminary hearing, the
opportunity for an effective interrogation is ended,
many times because of the advice he receives
from his attorney to keep his mouth shut.
If we view this whole problem realistically, we
must come to the conclusion that an interrogation opportunity is necessary and that legislative
provision ought to be made for a privately conducted police interrogation, covering a reasonable
period of time, of suspects who are not unwilling
to be interviewed, and that the only tactics or
6In addition, some concern should be exhibited
over the risk involved in freeing obviously guilty
offenders as a result of the courts' efforts to discipline
the police. For instance, following the Supreme Court's
reversal of his rape conviction, and his release from
custody, the defendant in Mallory v. U.S., 354 U.S.
449 (1957), committed two other offenses against
female victims. For the latest one he was found guilty
and sentenced to the penitentiary by a Pennsylvania
Court. For further details, see INBAu & SowLE, CASES
AND CO
NTs ON CIti ANAL JUsTicE 643 (1960).

[Vol. 52

techniques that are to be forbidden are those
which are apt to make an innocent person confess.
At one time it was fashionable in the United
States for jurists and law professors to refer to the
"Judges' Rules" which the English and Canadian
courts have laid down for the "guidance" of police
interrogators, and say: "If the British and Canadian police can be effective under such rules, then
our officers have no cause to complain." Such
naivet6 seems to have dissolved since the appearance in print of the frank admissions of at least
two prominent English police officials to the effect
that the Judges' Rules could not be honored because of practical limitations. These writers actually revealed how the Rules were circumventedby the simple devices of (a) postponing the time
when the officers were satisfied of the guilt of the
person they were interrogating, and (b) by pretending to search only for ambiguities when
questioning a person already in custody.7
There are other ways to guard against abuses in
police interrogation short of taking the privilege
away from them. Moreover, we could no more
afford to do that than we could stand the effects of
a law requiring automobile manufacturers to
place governors on all cars so that, in order to
make the highways safe, no one could go faster
than twenty miles an hour.
The only real, practically attainable protection
we can set up for ourselves against police interrogation abuses (just as with respect to arrest and
detention abuses) is to see to it that our police are
selected and promoted on a merit basis, that they
are properly trained, adequately compensated, and
that they are permitted to remain substantially
free from politically inspired interference. In the
hands of men of this competence there will be a
minimum degree of abusive practices. And once
again I suggest that the real interest that should
be exhibited by the legislatures and the courts is
with reference to the protection of the innocent
from the hazards of tactics and techniques that
are apt to produce confessions of guilt or other
false information. Individual civil liberties can survive in such an atmosphere, alongside the protective security of the public.
7
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